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l.l  TilE NEED FOR A STRONCiER EUROPEAN UNION POUCY A(iAINST CORRlnlTJON 
1.  The purpose of this Communication is to set out the main elements of a comprehensive  Union 
Policy against Conuption: The need to combat conuption at EU level has already been recognised 
and  a number of initiatives  have  been  taken  which  are  relevant  to  the fight  against  conuption. 
However these do not address all  concerns and were not been part of an integrated approach.  A 
number of  developments point to the need to take further and more co-ordinated action: 
•  The European Parliament in its  resolution on corruption of 15 December 1995  (rapporteur 
Mrs Salisch) called on the Commission as well the Council and Member States, to take action 
against conuption in a wide variety of  areas. That report, which was not restricted to corruption 
affecting the ECs' financial  interests,  emphasised the threat posed by corruption, its links with 
organised crime and the need for a Union policy on corruption. 
•  The report  of the  High  Level  Group  on  Organised  Crime  commissioned  by  the  European 
Council stresses the importance of  enhancing the fight against conuption. 
•  The  question  of corruption  is  currently  under  discussion  in  a  significant  number  of 
international fora including the G7, OECD, Council of Europe, United Nations and the 
World Trade Organization (see Annex  1).  The outcome of these discussions will  have 
implications for the Union and it is becoming increasingly clear that the Union has to act in a 
coordinated way if  it is to safeguard its interests effectively. 
2.  The interests of  the Union are affected by conuption as it 
undermines sound decision making, 
distorts  competition  and  challenges principles of open and  free  markets,  in  particular the 
proper functioning of  the internal market; 
damages the financial interests of  the European Communities; 
adversely affects external policies in respect of  a number of  states receiving 
assistance; and 
is at variance with the transparent and open conduct of  international trade. 
3.  The Union has an interest in formulating a  coherent strategy on corruption both 
within  and  outside  its  borders  while  fuUy  respecting  international  legal  roles  on 
jurisdiction.  Such  a  strategy  should  encompass  international  trade and  competition, 
Community expenditure abroad, Community own resources, development co-operation 
policies and the pre-accession strategy. 
1.2  THE Dll\.1ENSIONS OF CORRUPTION 
4.  Corruption relates to any abuse of  power or impropriety in the decision making process brought 
about by some undue inducement or benefit.  This general notion of  corruption may be considered 
in the context of  a number of  parameters. 
1  b •  Different fonns of  misconduct may aftect the decision making process.  In legal tenns they  may 
fall  under different categories e.g.  abuse, fraud, trafficking in influence, bribes, commissions. Not 
all  these kind  of practices are necessarily  criminal offences in every Member  State. There is  no 
single unifonn  definition  of all  the  constituent elements of corruption.  There  are  examples  of 
practices which are  not  criminal  offences in one Member State but which are  still  regarded  as 
corrupt  in  other Member  States,  for  example  the  provision  of gifts  where  there  is  a tacit 
expectation that the person providing gifts may receive favourable treatment. 
•  All acts of  corruption involve at least two parties, the party who offers the bribe - the offence of 
active corruption - and the party who accepts the bribe - the offence of a passive corruption. 
Active corruption can involve either a private individual,  or a legal entity (such  as a company) 
offering  bribes.  Passive  corruption  can  involve  the  acceptance  of bribes  by  public  officials, 
politicians, employees, etc.  It can also  include persons who do not make decisions themselves 
but have influence over the decision maker. 
•  Corruption is not limited to the public sector.  Also in the private sector a bribe may induce a 
person to act in breach of  a contractual, administrative or ethical obligation. 
•  Corruption can be international.  Bribes can involve payments in other states.  It may also involve 
payments,  on the  national tenitory, to foreign  officials and  officials of the EC or international 
organisations. 
•  Certain policy areas may be viewed as particularly vulnerable to corruption.  The legislator may 
wish  to  concentrate on these areas  which  have special  characteristics.  An example is  the EU 
instrument dealing only with corruption which damages the ECs'  financial  interests.  Clearly a 
specific Union level approach was required. Work in the OECD has concentrated on corruption. 
in international business transactions because this type of corruption has particular implications 
for economic transactions involving OECD members. 
5.  All  Member States criminalise the bribery of their own  public officials
1 but not  in a similar 
way. 
1  The  following definitions of passive and  active corruption of public officials  have 
been  used  in  the  draft convention on the light against conuption involving officials of the EC  or ofticials of Member 
States  of the  European  Union  and  give  an  indication  of  the  constituent  elements  which  are 
common  to  the  15  Member  States. 
"The  deliberate  action  of  an  official  who  requests  or  receives,  directly  or 
through  a  third party,  advantages  of  any  kind  whatsoever  ,  for  himself or for  a 
third party,  or  accepts  a  promise  of  such  an  advantage,  to  act  or  refrain  from 
acting in accordance with his duty or in the exercise of his  functions  in breach 
of his official duties shall constitute pass~ve corruption. 
The  deliberate  action  of  whosoever  promises  or  gives,  directly  or  through  a 
third party,  an  advantage  of any  kind whatsoever  ,  to  an official for  himself  or 
for  a  third party  for  him  to  act  or  refrain  from  acting  in accordance with his 
duty  or in the  exercise of his  functions  in breach  of  his  official duties  shall 
constitute active  corruption." 
2 •  In some Member States if a bribe is paid on behalf of a company, then the company itself may be 
criminally liable while in other states the company will have no liability,  only the natural persons 
involved will have committed an offence even if it was for the benefit of  the company. 
•  In certain states,  elected officials,  Ministers or members  of Parliament  will  not  be regarded  as 
public officials and will not be subject to the same laws against corruption. 
•  In some states paying a bribe to a person who has influence over an official is not necessarily an 
offence. The bribe must be paid to the official who makes the actual decision before any criminal . 
offence is committed. 
•  In  some  states the  officials  must  act  in  breach  of his  official  duties.  So  no  crime  may  be 
committed when an official accepts a bribe to award a contract to a company which should have 
got the contract in any event. 
6.  At present in  the majority of Member States it  is not an offence to bribe a foreign official or 
officials of international organisations in  any  circumstances.  Even  in  the four  Member  States 
who can prosecute the bribery offoreign officials, different approaches are taken. 
•  One approach is the application of  territoriality. If  corruption of  a foreign official occurs on the 
territory  of such  a Member  State both  the  active  and  passive  parties  are  liable  to  criminal 
prosecution even if the bribe  is  not  a criminal  offence under the  law  of the foreign  official's 
home.  However no  offence  will  have  been  committed  in  that  Member  State  if the  act  of 
corruption occurs abroad 
•  Some countries take a broad approach to the question of  territoriality. They will take jurisdiction 
if  any element of the offence has occurred on their territory. Other countries have a more striCt 
approach.  They require the substantive part of the offence must have been committed on their 
territory before they will take jurisdiction. 
•  Another approach, which can be in addition to the territorial approach, is to establish jurisdiction 
on the basis of nationality.  It is then an offence for a national of that Member State to bribe a 
foreign official even if no element of  the offence is committed on its territory.  The offence may 
be limited to the Member State's national who paid the bribe (active corruption only)_ There may 
be a requirement  that the conduct is  also  a criminal  offence under the taw of the  state of the 
foreign official who was bribed (dual criminality). 
7.  A significant  number of Member  States  do  have  criminal  offences  involving  private sector 
corruption but the differences in approach between Member States is even more marked than that 
found with the corruption of  public officials. 
8.  This Communication is not advocating that there should be complete harmonisation of  Member 
States' laws and policies on corruption.  However there are certain key issues where a common 
approach at Union level is desirable. 
3 PART II: FlGHTlNG CORRUPTION IN SPECIFIC POLICY AREAS 
II.l  CORRUPTION AND CRIMINAl. LAW 
9.  One of  the essential elements in combating conuption is to ensure that it is criminalised. 
In addition to its deterrent and repressive effect, crirninalising conuption represents a clear and 
unequivocal statement that those practices are not acceptable and are against the public interest. 
Ideally the criminal law within the Union should address the bribery of EC officials, the bribery 
of officials of other Member States,  the bribery of officials from  states outside the Union and 
private sector conuption. 
10. In most Member States it is not an offence to bribe EC officials or officials of other Member 
States.  This poses a particular problem where the EC budget is being affected.  In  1995  Spain 
proposed  what  became  the  First Protocol  to  the  Convention  on  the  protection  of the 
European  Communities'  financial  interests
2
•  This  Protocol  makes  active  and  passive 
conuption involving  an official of  the Community or any Member State a criminal offence in all 
Member States if it damages the ECs'  financial interests.  The Protocol is not yet in force.  No 
target date for its implementation has been set  Its ratification is linked to the ratification of  the 
Convention on the Protection of  the financial interests of  the Union. 
11.  Member States should commit themselves to ratifYing and implementing the First 
Protocol by mid-1998. 
12.  'The First Protocol was limited to corruption affecting the ECs' financial interests.  Italy, 
therefore,  proposed  in  1996  a draft  convention  to  ensure  that active  and  passive  conuption 
involving officials of  EU institutions or officials of  Member States will be criminalised even if the 
EU' s financial interests are not affected. The substance of  this draft convention was agreed upon 
quickly but there have been delays in its adoption. 
13.  Member States should commit themselves  to adopting the draft convention  on  the 
fight against corruption involving officials of the EC or officials of Member States of the 
European Union as soon as possible with a view to its ratification by end 1998. 
14.  The initiatives taken so far do not address the conuption of  officials from third countries 
even  where  Community  funds  are  at  risk  As  regards  corruption outside the Union a step 
forward would be to criminalise the active conuption of a foreign official.  This would cover 
those persons within the EU  who bribe  officials of non Member States.  Any proposal has to 
respect international rules on jurisdiction. Therefore it should address offences committed in part 
or in whole on the territory of  a Member State and possibly also offences committed abroad by a 
national  of a Member State.  The  question  of dual  criminality  and  the  definition  to  be  used 
requires further consideration. 
2  Signed  on  of27/9/% 
4 15.  It is important that any agreement on criminalising bribery of  foreign officials involves as 
many countries as possible. This would ensure that Union enterprises subject to a law against the 
bribery of foreign officials are not put at a disadvantage compared to their competitors from 
other countries.  There were attempts in 197811979 to draw up a UN convention.  The Council 
of  Europe is at present drawing up a comprehensive convention which will address this issue. 
The OECD is  also  looking at this issue.  A draft  instrument is  to be discussed  at  this year's 
OECD Ministerial  It is limited to corruption affecting international business transactions.  This 
will be a valuable step forward.  It would however not address all types of corruption notably 
those affecting EU external financial and technical assistance. 
16.  The Commission supports the adoption of a common position under Title VI of the 
TEU favouring the criminalisation of the bribery of foreign officials with that objective to 
be pursued in the Council ofEurope/OECD. 
17.  Private sector corruption has not yet been addressed within the EU.  It occurs when for 
example a person in a private economic entity is bribed to act in a way which is in breach of  his 
or her duties.  Some Member States already criminalise private corruption to some degree
3
.  In 
other Member States civil  or administrative measures are the only remedies applicable.  Private 
corruption is being discussed in the Council of  Europe. Because of its implications, notably for 
competition, the Union has an interest in combating this form of  corruption. 
18.  The Commission is  in f2vour of criminalising private corruption using Title VI of 
the TEU and, as a  starting point, supports the adoption of a  common position for the 
purposes of  the negotiations currently underway in the Council of Europe. 
19.  Criminal  sanctions alone are not a  sufficient  method  of combating corruption.  Only a 
modest number of corruption cases are successfully prosecuted.  A wide variety of measures, 
such as improved transparency and socio-economic conditions, are also required.  The following 
sections refer to some of  the more relevant  non-criminal measures against corruption. 
II.2.  TAX DEDUCTIBlLITY 
20.  In calculating  taxable  business  profits,  it  is  normally  permissible  to  deduct  from  the 
business  receipts  those  expenses  that  are  associated  with  earning  the  income.  This  is  a 
3 
7  Member  States have provisions  criminalising the bribery of the  employees  or 
agents  of private  sector companies.  In  some,  although it is  a  criminal  offence 
it is dealt with under  the  law  on  labour,  unfair competition or unfair business 
practices.  An  example  of  this is the  Code  du  travail  Fran9ais,  article L.l52-6 
which  makes  it a  criminal  offence  for  a  manager  or  employee  to solicit or accept, 
directly or  indirectly,  without  the  knowledge  and  authorisation of his  employer 
offers  or promises  of gifts,  discounts  or consideration to carry out  or abstain 
from carrying out  an  act relating  to his position or facilitated by  his position. 
In others,  the  general  criminal  law  applies  to corruption in both the  public  and 
private sectors.  For  example  section  1(1)  of  the  U.K.  Prevention of Corruption 
.net  1906  applies  to all  "agents" whether  in the public or private sector. 
5 widely-accepted  principle  of taxation.  That  said,  not  all  current  expenses  are  universally 
deductible.  For  example,  some  countries  specifically  disallow  tax  deductions  for  certain 
categories of  expenditure, such as payments which  are illegal under the laws of  that country, or 
entertainment expenses. 
21.  Only a few  Member States'  tax codes provide for the outright disallowance of conupt 
payments made  to  foreign  officials.  Apart  from  such  a total  disallowance,  the main  existing 
grounds for not  allowing  tax  deductions in  some countries include the nature of the payments 
themselves (gifts and entertainment, etc.  may not be tax deductible, irrespective of  whether their 
acceptance is conupt or not);  the difficulties in substantiating such payments; or their illegality 
(whether in the country of  the payer, or in that of  the recipient). 
22.  A number of  Member States specifically pennit tax deductions for the bribery of foreign 
officials  if the  bribes  are  recognised  as  being  customary  business  practice  in  the  territory  in 
question.  In such circumstances, the giving of the tax allowance may be made conditional upon 
the disclosure to the tax authorities of  the identity of  the recipient. 
23.  The two major EU trading partners have differing grounds for disallowing tax deductions 
for the bribery offoreign officials.  The USA does not allow deductions for bribes paid to foreign 
officials if the payments constitute criminal offences under its Foreign Conupt Practices Act of 
1977.  In Japan, however, bribes are are disallowed for other reasons. 
24.  Taxation policy is classically regarded as being morally neutral.  This view is not justified 
where allowances are granted for  what is  a criminal  activity in the state in which the  bribe is 
accepted.  This  can  be  seen  as  endorsing  criminal  acts  committed  in  other jurisdictions. 
Moreover, tax allowances which may induce bribery have implications for competition, and may 
distort  the  single  market  and  international  trade.  It  also  affects  the  economic  and  social 
development of third  countries.  The practice may engender scepticism in candidate and  third 
countries  as  to  real  aims  of the  Union  when  EU  enterprises  are  seen  to  be  receiving  tax 
allowances for bribing officials of  these countries in the pursuit of  business. 
25.  The criminalisation  of the  bribery  of foreign  officials  will  have  some  positive effect.  In 
countries where payments are tax deductible as long as they were not illegal, the criminalisation 
will  automatically  put  an  end  to tax  deductibility.  But  it  could  be  some  time  before  such  a 
criminalisation takes place.  Even when it does, it will not necessarily resolve all the issues. 
o  A state might allow tax deductibility unless a criminal offence has been proved.  In  p~actice, a 
requirement for proof could mean very little improvement over the existing position. 
e  There will  still  be  cases where a bribe  paid  to an  official  of a third  country constitutes a 
criminal offence in  that  third country but  not  in  the EU Member State.  This  could be  so 
where a substantive part of the offence was committed abroad, or because the requirement 
for dual criminality has not been met. 
•  There are dubious practices which,  for various reasons,  will not be criminal  offences.  The 
absence of  criminalisation does not remove the moral case for disallowing tax deductibility for 
such payments.  The practical difficulties in doing so should however not be underestimated. 
6 26.  There are calls !rom a number of  fora  tor the abolition of such tax deductibility which may 
favour bribery (UN,  the Council of Europe,  the OECD and the  European Parliament).  All  15 
Member States have adopted the OECD recommendation that "countries which do not disallow 
the deductibility of bribes to foreign  officials  re-examine  such treatment  with the  intention of 
denying this deductibility".  It would appear therefore that all Member States are in  principle in 
favour of  disallowing such tax deductibility.  Some Member States are, however, concerned that 
they will be at a competitive disadvantage if other major trading nations continue to allow it. 
Furthennore, it may be easier for an affected Member State to introduce changes in response to 
an EU instrument rather than to initiate refonn on its own, at national level. 
27.  The Union has an interest in a common approach to the abolition of tax allowances that 
may induce corruption. 
•  The  fact  that  conuption  can  distort  compet1t10n  is  already  recognised  by  international 
organisations such as the OECD and the Council of  Europe, as well as being already reflected 
to some degree in the laws of certain Member States (e.g.  Gennan and  Austrian legislation 
against unfair competition).  The purpose of bribery in a business context is to gain an illicit 
advantage which distorts competition. 
•  State measures which effectively encourage the use of  bribery by allowing the deductibility of 
bribes  to  foreign  officials  give  exporting  enterprises  in  those  Member  States  an  unfair 
advantage  both  over  domestically-orientated  competitors  and  ever enterprises  in  Member 
States where  no  such deductibility is allowed.  The external dimension of an  action against 
bribery therefore has to be taken into account. 
•  The  question  of tax  deductibility  of bribes  for  foreign  officials  is  not  just  relevant  for 
competition and commerce.  Clearly  any  policy  measure  relating to the  bribery  of foreign 
officials  has  implications  for  development  co-operation  and  potentially  affects  developing 
countries. 
28.  The  Union  should  also  exploit  to  the  full  extstmg  charmels  for .the  exchanges  of 
infonnation between taxation authorities so far as conupt payments are concerned.  In so  far as 
a bribe may affect the tax liability of  the recipient, the Mutual Assistance Directive
4 provides a 
framework for the  provision of infonnation to the taxation authorities of the Member State in 
which  the recipient  of a bribe  resides.  Ensuring  that  the  recipient  is  at  least  taxed  on  sums 
received  would act as a deterrent to bribery,  even  if the taxation  authorities may not  pass the 
infonnation on to the judicial authorities in the state concerned. 
29.  As  an  initiaJ  approach· the  Commission  wiD  raise  the  question  of  the  tax 
deductibility for bribes with the Member States in the appropriate fora, with a view to 
reaching consensus to abolish such provisions in the fram"ework of  a joint concerted move. 
4  (Directive Tln99/EEC) 
7 II.3  n-IE SINGLE MARKET AND OTIIER INTERNAL POLICIES 
30.  The free movement of  goods and services is based on the principles of  non-discrimination 
and free competition.  Corruption runs against these principles.  There is a case for examining the 
rules protecting the free movement in a number of  areas to see whether specific measures aimed 
at combating corruption may be proposed. 
II. 3  .1  Public Procurement Directives 
3  1  .  These  directives  aim  at  assuring  transparency · and  equality  of  access  for  public 
procurement. 
The existing directives
5 on public contracts under the heading  'Criteria for qualitative selection' 
lay down that any enterprise/supplier may be excluded from participation in the contract 
who has been convicted of an offence concerning his professional conduct by a judgement 
which has the force of  res judi  cat~ 
who  has  been  guilty  of grave  professional  misconduct  proven  by  any  means  which  the 
contracting authorities can justifY.  · 
These provisions cover corruption. 
32.  The  Commission  Green  Paper  entitled  "Public  Procurement  in  the  European  Union: 
Exploring  the  Way  Forward"  of November  1996  recognises  that  fair,  transparent  and  non-
discriminatory award procedures, together with the possibility for  suppliers to have recourse to 
national courts to assert their rights limit the risks of  fraud and corruption.  Even though the fight 
against corruption may not be the primary objective,  any improvement in the existing situation 
regarding public procurement could usefully contribute to that fight.  One particularly relevant 
idea  put forward  in  the  Green  Paper  is that of a statement  of personal  accountability  by  the 
responsible national official that the Union's public procurement rules have been followed. 
33.  Areas  which could  be  explored  further  include  black1isting,  anti-corruption  commitments 
and  civil  remedies.  There  are  provisions  in  the  public  procurement  directives
6  dealing  with 
attestation and civil remedies but only in respect of  the authority which awards the contract.  · 
In an international context it is very much in the Union's interest to promote greater transparency 
in the area of public procurement.  This objective can be pursued in the OECD and the WTO 
where work is on going at present 
34.  Following  the  consultation  launched  by  the  Green  Paper,  the Commission  will 
explore how the application of provisions  in  the area of public procurement relevant to 
the fight against corruption can be improved. 
5 
(93/36/I::EC,  93/37/Ee~<.:  and  92/50/EEC) 
6 
(Directive  92/13/EEC) 
8 II.3.2 Financial Transactions 
35.  Corruption frequently involves a transfer in cash or kind.  Cash transactions, particularly 
those involVing large sums of  money, can leave traces as the money moves from the body paying 
the  bribe  to  the person  receiving  it.  The bribe  has  to be  sourced  from  somewhere  to be 
transferred and finally the recipient has to deposit the bribe (e.g.  a bank account) or convert it 
into goods, services or property.  As bribes are generally illegal, any measure which allows the 
payment of  bribes to become known serves as a preventive measure,  deterring the payment of 
bribes, as well as facilitating the confiscation of  illicit money paid to public officials. 
II.3.2.a  Company accounts 
36.  If a company uses its assets to pay bribes then these payments must be accounted for  in 
some way.  The existence of "slush funds"  in  companies are  a key element  in  the  corruption 
process.  This  may  be countered  to  some  degree by  rules  on the  transparency  of company 
accounts.  Work in the Council ofEurope has drawn attention to the importance of  auditors and 
company  accounts  in  combating  corruption.  The OECD has  recommended  that  accounting 
requirements and practices should provide for adequate recording of relevant payments.  In July 
1996, the Commission presented a Green Paper on "the role, the position and the liability of  the 
statutory auditor within the European Union".  That paper also addresses the role of  the auditor 
in detecting corruption in the company accounts.  A series of follow-up  actions, based on co-
operation with the representative bodies of  the accounting profession, will be undertaken, to be 
monitored by the Contact Committee on the Accounting Directives. 
37.  Following  the  Green  Paper consultative  phase  the  Commission  will  present  a 
Communication with concrete proposals on how the Accounting and Auditing Directives 
and their application can be made more effective in the fight against corruption. 
Il.3.2.b  Financial institutions 
38.  A bribe is normally routed at some stage in the transaction through a financial institution. 
The OECD  has  recommended  that banking  and  financial  institutions  should  be  required  to 
maintain adequate records for inspection and investigation in cases of corruption.  The Second 
Banking Directive already requires every credit institution to have a sound administrative and 
accounting procedures and  adequate internal  control mechanisms.  The question of access to 
those records by police or judicial authorities is normally determined by national law. 
39.  The Money Laundering Directive applies to the proceeds of drugs offences and to the 
proceeds of  other offences designated by Member States.  Banks and other financial  institutions 
would have to keep and make available customer identification and transaction details for use as 
evidence  in  any  investigation  into  money  laundering  and  would  also  be  obliged  to  report 
suspicious transactions.  The Commission  has  already proposed a "Second Protocol" to the 
9 Convention on the Protection of  financial interests of the Community which makes it a criminal 
offence to launder the proceeds of  corruption in relation to the EC budget 
40.  Member States should establish as a criminal offence the laundering of the proceeds 
of corruption.  The Commission has already fonnally proposed this as regards corruption 
affecting the Communities financial interests in the draft "Second Protocol". 
113.3  Other measures and policies 
41 .  In any  particular sector such as  agriculture,  structural funds,  the transit  regime,  specific 
measures may contribute to combat corruption.  This section explores the application of certain 
. anti-corruption measures which might be of value in various areas where  Community policies 
involve large scale expenditure with a potential for corruption or other forms of  abuse. 
II.3.3.a  Blacklisting 
42.  Blacklisting provides a mechanism to recognise an undertaking which has been convicted 
of having committed some infiingement.  In this  regard it may  also be envisaged to identify 
companies  who  represent  a  substantiated  risk  of  non-reliability  as  regards  corruption. 
Blacklisting can be used  to prevent such  undertakings from  competing for  or being  awarded 
further contracts/subventions or it may be used merely to alert people to possible risks in dealing 
with such an undertaking. 
43.  A  Council  Regulation
7  provides  for  measures  against  blacklisted  operators,  such  as 
exclusion from entitlements under the FEOGA guarantee section.  This Regulation deals with 
irregularities in respect of Community provisions.  It does not,  however,  cover every form  of 
corruption  committed  in  connection  with  FEOGA  funds.  Furthermore  nothing  prevents  a 
particular  company,  which  has  previously  been  excluded  under  this  Regulation  because  of 
corrupt practices from applying for a contract or entitlement which is funded by another part of 
the Community budget. 
44.  The  provisions  in  the  directives  on  public  contracts  under  the  heading  'Criteria  for 
qualitative selection' lay down that an enterprise may be excluded from participation in a contract 
in the case of  certain infringements 
8
.  These provisions cover corruption.  They apply equally to 
contracts awarded by the Commission or its services. 
45.  Establishing some form  of comprehensive blacklisting system  applicable to areas where 
Community finances are at risk could be considered.  This would include the area of  external 
assistance.  The use of that  list  would vary  from  sector to sector.  In  some cases it  may  be 
appropriate for a blacklisted enterprise to be automatically excluded from  certain benefits for  a 
7 
(Council  reg.  1469/%,  Gommis"Jon  reg.  "145/96} 
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- who  bas  bee11  convicted  of  an  offence  concerning  his  pr-otessi._,,nal  conduct  Ly  a 
judgment  which  IHl::~  the  fot·ce  of  res  judl.cata; 
- who  has  been  guilty  of  grave  professional  misconduct  proven  by  any  means  which 
the  contrdcting  aL1tl1orities  can  jiJStify. (See  also  section  1!.3.1  above.) 
10 set period.  In  other cases such  as  public  procurement,  blacklisting  would be for  information 
purposes.  The deciding authority, having been alerted to the past record, might have the option 
to determine what action should be taken.  Alternatively a register of legal and natural persons 
who have been blacklisted could be established so that national and Commission services could 
be alerted to the dangers of dealing with those particular operators.  Data bases could identify 
who is behind firms and be readily accessible. 
46.  An  important consideration to be taken into account  when exploring the possibility of 
establishing a system of blacklisting would be the need to respect data protection principles as 
well as the principles
9 of  proportionality, subsidiarity and the rights of  the individual. 
Il.3.3.b  Commitments against corruption 
47.  All competitors for a specific project might be required to give a written undertaking that 
they will  not use bribery to obtain the contract.  This commitment discourages bribery and can 
leave the enterprise open to a civil action for damages or a contractual fine.  Another approach is 
to restrict certain tenders to enterprises who have adopted special codes of  conduct or practices 
against the use of  corruption in seeking to obtain contracts.  Caution would have to be exercised 
with this latter approach to ensure that it does not unduly restrict fair competition for tenders. 
48.  The Commission will work on a scheme of blacklisting and commitments against 
corruption applicable to areas where Community finances are at risk.  It would allow for 
an inter-sectorial exchange of infonnation on persons and enterprises who have engaged 
in corruption while respecting data protection requirements. 
ll.3.3.c  Civil remedies 
49.  A criminal  or administrative sanction does not compensate the  underta~<i.ng who was not 
awarded a contract because of  corrupt practices by a competitor.  A civil action would provide 
some remedy for such loss.  It would also allow an injured competitor to take action against a 
corrupt competitor on his own initiative and  as  such might  reduce the need for  administrative 
action.  It would be self policing. 
50.  Although not  specifically aimed at corruption, the possibility of civil  remedies does exist 
under the Public Procurement Directives for an enterprise which has lost out on a contract due 
to an irregularity  in the procedures followed in awarding the contract.  However such action is 
limited to the public prDcurement area and lies against the body awarding the contract and not 
against the competitor who actually paid the bribe.  A more general approach for civil action 
by  enterprises against competitors who have  paid bribes is being  examined by the Council of 
Europe. 
9 
Directive  95/46/EC 
11 51.  At an  appropriate stage  the Commission  will  propose  the adoption  of a  common 
position  on  the  question  of civil  remedies  against  corruption  in  the  context  of the 
discussions going on in the Council of Europe. 
Il.3.3.d.  Whistle Blowers 
52.  Whistle blowers are employees working for corrupt enterprises who alert the authorities 
to the fact that their firm is engaged in corrupt practices.  Such "whistle blowers"  are often left 
without  the  appropriate  legal  protection  and  can  be  victimised  for  their  actions.  The  report 
entitled "Whistleblowing, fraud and the European Union"  published in February 1996 by Public 
Concern  at  Work  (London)  called  for  by  the  European  Parliament  and  sponsored  by  the 
Commission addresses many of  the issues involved.  The Commission is carrying out a study on 
national legislation and practices regarding the individual  rights of workers to be consulted on 
internal  company  matters,  including the worker's rights to  be protected against  any prejudice 
arising from a legitimate complaint put forward by a worker to a public authority. 
53.  Member States should review and, where appropriate, amend their existing law to 
ensure that individuals who report instances of  corruption are adequately protected from 
victimisation. 
ll.4  EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE AND C0-0PERATION 
11.4. 1  Preventing Corruption in Third Countries Benefiting from EC Assistance 
54.  The Commission has included the fight against corruption in its external co-operation and 
assistance policies.  Funding is provided for a range of projects which relate to the fight against 
corruption  directly  (regional  seminars)  or  indirectly  (improving  the  judicial  structure  and 
administrative transparency).  Initiatives are taken to combat corruption such as the organisation 
of seminars on rules of  origin and workshops aimed at improving financial management and the 
fight against fraud. 
55.  The fight against corruption requires a balanced approach.  The conditionality linked to the 
fight against fraud and corruption must be part of a coherent development strategy.  There is  a 
case  for  greater  coherence  between  the  Union's  anti-corruption  policies  taking  account  of 
regional differences. 
56.  Any strategy should: 
support the creation of  appropriate legalisation and control mechanisms and institutions by 
way of  providing the necessary technical assistance, 
12 improve the functioning and transparency of  public procurement, 
take  performance  regarding  the  management  of public  resources  into  account  when 
deciding on initiatives based on financing from Community funds, 
support the improvement of  the socio-economic environment. 
57.  The Commission will establish a coherent anti-corruption strategy in the area of its 
co-operation with Third countries which benefit  from EC assistance or have concluded 
co-operation or assistance agreements with the EC. 
The Commission will further its support for the prevention of  corruption, in particular by 
promoting  conditions  favouring  transparency,  good  governance  and  an  independent 
judiciary and by  providing technical  assistance for  establishing appropriate legislation 
and efficient procurement and control mechanisms. 
The Commission will review its procurement and contract rules in the field of foreign aid 
with a view  to introducing more effective measures against corruption.  It will  seek to 
harmonise rules applied in different groups of countries.  This revision will  include the 
question of sanctions against firms which engage in corrupt practices. 
1!.4.2.  Anti-Corruption Programmes 
I 
58.  Certain  candidate  countries  for  EU  membership  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  face 
problems with corruption during the transition to full market economies.  It is important that the 
Union helps these countries to overcome these problems.  It affects their own reform programme 
and  furthermore  corrupt practices may  spill  over to neighbouring  states in the context of an 
enlarged Union. 
59.  In addition to concerns about the effect of corruption on third countries themselves, the 
Union, as a major provider of  aid, has to be concerned ifEU financial support is diverted from its 
intended  purpose due  to corruption.  The  European Parliament,  the  Court  of Auditors  and 
Member States are keen to see better management control and cost  -effectiveness.  This issue is 
currently  discussed  at  the  Personal  Representatives  Group  on  SEM  2000.  The  recent 
reorientation of the PHARE programme puts emphasis  on the fight  against  irregularities and 
fraud. 
60.  Technical assistance for containing corruption in the public sector in Eastern Europe has 
already been provided to a limited degree under the PHARE programme (e.g. the joint Council 
of Europe/  EU OCTOPUS  programme  on  corruption  and  organised  crime  in  Central  and 
Eastern Europe).  The joint SIGMA project with the OECD which  addresses the problem of 
public  procurement is  also  relevant.  The Newly Independent  States have their own problems 
with corruption which  are affecting their process of economic  and  democratic  transition.  A 
· special initiative under the T  ACIS programme could be of  relevance. 
13 61.  In the case of Mediterranean third  countries,  there  is  a movement towards free  trade and 
strong links with the single market.  The 27 Euromed partners specifically committed themselves 
in the Barcelona Declaration of28 November 1995 to fight jointly against corruption.  Moreover 
the Council  MEDA  rcgulation
10
,  which  establishes co-operation procedures, defines strict  and 
precise  standards  for  the  transparent  management  of  financial  and  technical  assistance  to 
Mediterranean third countries. 
62.  Special  anti-corntption  programmes  should  be  established,  particularly  in  the 
applicant countries  in  Central and  Eastern  Europe  in  line  with  the protocols  to  the 
Europe Agreements on opening of programmes and  in  connection with  the envisaged 
Accession Partnership established around a national programme for the implementation 
of the acquis  .• 
U.4.3  "'Good Governance" and anti-corruption clauses 
63.  The  Lome  IV  Convention,  as  revised  by  the  agreement  signed  in  Mauritius  on  4 
November  1995  now  includes  "good  governance"  as  one  of its  basic  principles.  A  more 
widespread application of this  principle is  required  if the Union  is to pursue a comprehensive 
strategy. 
64.  The  principle  of  "good  governance"  should  be  considered  for  inclusion  in  all 
international agreements of assistance, co-operation and development. 
65.  The inclusion of  anti corruption clauses could be envisaged in all specific contracts which 
are  aid  funded.  For example  in  March  1990 it was agreed  with  the  ACP  States to  include 
specific clauses aimed at fighting corruption in the general conditions for  all contracts financed 
through the European Development Fund.  The Commission is now reviewing such clauses to 
see how their effectiveness can be improved. 
This  particular  issue  is  receiving  attention  at  an  international  level.  The  World  Bank  has 
strengthened its approach in thi3 area and the Development Aid Committee of the OECD made 
recommendations in 1996 on the inclusion of  anti-conuption clauses in aid funded contracts. 
66.  The Commission, in co-operation with the OECD, the World Bank and remaining 
multilateral donors, will  ensure that anti corruption clauses are included in aid funded 
contracts. 
1 •)  (1\
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14 ll. 5  CO-OPERATION lN lNTERNATIONJ\L FORA 
67.  If the EU is  to adopt strong anti-corruption measures which  may  have  implications  for 
trade, it is in the interest of  the EU that action be agreed at the widest possible level in order to 
achieve synergy benefits and to avoid a competitive disadvantage. 
The EU  must also  seek  to ensure compatibility between internal  rules  aimed -primarily  at the 
single  market  and  external  policies  which  aim  notably  at  strengthening  the  open  multilateral 
trading system.  The absence of  such compatibility could be costly for trade and industry. 
68.  The  issue  of corruption and  transparency  arises  regularly  in  international  organisations 
such  as  the G7,  World  Trade Organisation  (WTO),  the  United  Nations,  the  OECD  and  the 
Council of  Europe.  It is also high on the agenda of  the EU's major  tr~ing partners, particularly 
the USA. A UN declaration on "Corruption and Bribery in Transnational Commercial Activities" 
was adopted in December 1996, which calls on Member States to criminalise bribery (domestic 
or transnational)  and  prohibit tax deductibility  of bribes.  A Model  Procurement  Law  of the 
·United Nations Commission oflnternational Trade Law (UNICITRAL) has been developed. 
69.  The new  WTO  Government  Procurement  Agreement  (GPA) entered into  force  on  1 
January 1996.  As the GP  A is "plurilateral", not all WTO members are signatories.  At this stage, 
it does not include certain key markets in Asia, the Americas, Eastern and Central Europe and 
Africa. 
At their Singapore meeting of December  1996, WTO Ministers agreed to establish a working 
group  on  the  subject  of transparency  in  government  procurement  practices  with  a  view  to 
developing elements for inclusion in an appropriate agreement. 
70.  The Commission, will  also  press for an ambitious and CO"'ordinated  policy :line to 
combat corruption in all appropriate international fora  inCluding the G-:7  in  Denver in 
June 1997. ANNEX 1 
INTERNATIONAL INTI1ATIVES 
The G7 heads of  State in Lyon on 28 June 1996 stated that: 
"  ... we are resolved to combat corruption in international business transactions, which is detrimental 
to transparency and fairness and imposes heavy economic and political costs. In keeping with the 
commitment  of OECD  Ministers  to  criininalise  such  bribery  in  an  effective  and  co-ordinated 
manner,  we  urge  that  the  OECD  further  examine  the  modalities  and  appropriate  international 
instruments to facilitate criminalisation and consider proposals for action in 1997." 
The G7 Finance Ministers on 27  April  1997 made reference to question of  bribery and corruption 
and the issue is likely to come up again at the Denver G7 /P 8 summit in June 1997. 
The OECD Ministerial  Council on  II April  1996 adopted a  recommendation against  tax 
deductibility for bribes to foreign government officials.  This was in addition to recommendations 
on  corruption adopted  earlier  in  May  1994.  It  also  asked  that  a  report  and  proposals  on  the 
criminalisation of  the bribery offoreign officials in line with the G7/P8 summit statement in Lyon be 
submitted to it in  1997.  The issue is on the agenda of  the May 1997 Ministerial Council. 
A World Trade Organisation  agreement on Government Procurement entered into force 
on  1 January 1996 laying down various provisions on transparency,  openness and legal challenge 
which  will  help  alleviate  the  problem  of corruption  in  the  area  of public  procurement.  This 
agreement, while relevant for key trading partners of  the Community does not apply,  however, to 
all  WTO countries.  QUAD countries have  therefore tried  to  increase compliance at the WTO 
level.  At the Singapore Ministerial Conference December 1996, negotiations were launched on a 
new  interim agreement on transparency,  openness and  due process (legal challenge).  Following 
these  efforts,  further  work  will  be  undertaken  in  the  WTO  to  develop  an  agreement  on 
transparency. 
The Council  of Europe has  established  a  special  multidisciplinary  group  on  corruption 
(GMC).  A detailed action  programme has  been adopted.  The group is  now discussing  draft 
instruments in the civil,  penal and administrative areas.  The theme of the next Justice Ministerial 
meeting in Prague, June 1997 is Corruption and Organised Crime. 
The United Nations have addressed the issue of  corruption on a number of  occasions.  Most 
recently,  in December  1996  as part of a resolution on Action against  Corruption,  the General 
Assembly adopted  an  International  Code of Conduct for Public Officials.  They also adopted  a 
declaration  against  Corruption  and  Bribery  in  International  Commercial  Transactions  which 
addresses inter alia the question of  bribery offoreign officials, tax deductible bribes, extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and bank secrecy. 
The World Bank in  August  1996  introduced  specific  anti-corruption  provisions  in  their 
procurement guidelines which apply to all goods and services financed from  bank funds.  Later in 
1996  a decision  wa's  made  that  the  Bank  should  treat  corruption as  a development  issue  and 
internal groups were established to review the situation under a range of  headings. 
16 The  International  Monetary  Fund  has  recently  stressed  the  importance  of fighting 
corruption and has focused on the promotion of  good governance. 
In  March 1996 the Organisation of  American States (OAS) adopted a convention against 
corruption. 
The  Transatlantic  Agenda  and  the  Joint  EU-US  Action  Plan  includes  a  specific 
commitment to combating corruption and bribery.  The US and European business communities 
at a meeting of  the Transatlantic business dialogue in Chicago 8-9 November 1996 included a 
reference in their declaration deploring bribery and corruption and stating that the issue would 
remain on their agenda for 1997.  · 
In  May  1996  the  International Chamber of Commerce  strengthened  its  rules  of 
conduct on bribery in international business transactions and urged greater action at national and 
international level against corruption. 
Transparency  International,  a  non-governmental  organisation  dedicated  to curbing 
corruption in international business transactions, has presented a paper advocating that· action in a 
number of  areas should be taken by the EU against corruption 
17 